Bind shell attack detection

ABSTRACT

Methods, apparatus and computer program products implement embodiments of the present invention that include collecting data packets transmitted between multiple entities over a network, and grouping the packets at least according to their source and destination entities and their times, into connections to which the packets belong. Pairs of the connections are identified having identical source and destination entities and times that are together within a specified time window, and sets of features are generated for the identified pairs of the connections. The features in the pairs are evaluated in order to detect a given pair of connections indicating malicious activity, and an alert is generated for the malicious activity.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/950,234, filed Apr. 11, 2018, which is incorporated herein byreference.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates generally to computer systems andnetworks, and particularly to detecting a bind shell attack on acomputer in a network.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

In many computers and network systems, multiple layers of securityapparatus and software are deployed in order to detect and repel theever-growing range of security threats. At the most basic level,computers use anti-virus software to prevent malicious software fromrunning on the computer. At the network level, intrusion detection andprevention systems analyze and control network traffic to detect andprevent malware from spreading through the network.

Documents incorporated by reference in the present patent applicationare to be considered an integral part of the application except that tothe extent any terms are defined in these incorporated documents in amanner that conflicts with the definitions made explicitly or implicitlyin the present specification, only the definitions in the presentspecification should be considered.

The description above is presented as a general overview of related artin this field and should not be construed as an admission that any ofthe information it contains constitutes prior art against the presentpatent application.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

There is provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the presentinvention a method, including collecting data packets transmittedbetween multiple entities over a network, grouping the packets at leastaccording to their source and destination entities and their times, intoconnections to which the packets belong, identifying pairs of theconnections having identical source and destination entities and timesthat are together within a specified time window, generating sets offeatures for the identified pairs of the connections, evaluating, by aprocessor, the features in the pairs in order to detect a given pair ofconnections indicating malicious activity, and generating an alert forthe malicious activity.

In one embodiment, the malicious activity includes a bind shell attack.In some embodiments, evaluating the features includes determining abaseline of the features, and comparing the features in the pairs ofconnections to the baseline of the features.

In additional embodiments, each given pair of connections includes firstand second connections, and wherein each of the features are selectedfrom a list consisting of respective ports used during the first and thesecond connections, respective start times of the first and the secondconnections, respective end times of the first and the secondconnections, respective durations of the first and the secondconnections, respective volumes of the first and the second connections,respective reverse volumes of the first and the second connections, asource IP address for the first and the second connections, adestination IP address for the first and the second connections and aprotocol for the first and the second connections. In one embodiment,detecting the malicious activity includes detecting that the first andthe second ports are different for the given pair of connections.

In further embodiments, each given pair of connections includes firstand second connections, wherein a given feature includes a differencebetween respective start times of the first and the second connections.In supplemental embodiments, each given pair of connections includesfirst and second connections, wherein a given feature includes adifference between an end time of the first connection and a start timeof the second connection. In another embodiment, each given pair ofconnections includes first and second connections, wherein a givenfeature includes a volume of data transmitted from the source entity tothe destination entity during the first connection divided by a volumeof data transmitted from the destination entity to the source entityduring the first connection.

In some embodiments, each given pair of connections includes first andsecond connections, wherein evaluating the features includes applying aplurality rules to the features, and wherein detecting the given pair ofconnections indicating malicious activity includes detecting that atleast a predetermined number of the rules vote true. In a firstembodiment, a given rule votes false if a duration of the secondconnection is less than a small value, if a volume of data transmittedin the second connection is less than a negligible value, and whereinthe given rule votes true otherwise. In a second embodiment, a givenrule votes true if a volume of data transmitted in the first connectionis less than a small value, and wherein the given rule votes falseotherwise.

In a third embodiment, a given rule votes true if a difference between astart time of the first connection and a start time of the secondconnection is greater than a negligible value and less than a minimalvalue, and wherein the given rule votes false otherwise. In a fourthembodiment, a given rule votes true if a difference between an end timeof the first connection and a start time of the second connection is anegligible value that can be positive or negative, and wherein the givenrule votes false otherwise. In a fifth embodiment, a given rule votestrue if a protocol used for the first connection is in a specified setof protocols, and wherein the given rule votes false otherwise.

In a sixth embodiment, a given rule votes true if a protocol used forthe second connection is either unknown or is in a specified set ofprotocols, and wherein the given rule votes false otherwise. In aseventh embodiment, a given rule votes false if a count of distinct IPaddresses of the entities that communicated with ports used during thefirst and the second connections is greater than a small value, andwherein the given rule votes true otherwise. In an eighth embodiment, agiven rule votes false if, for a given pair of connections including agiven destination entity, a count of unique source entities thataccessed the given destination entity using a first given port duringthe first connection and a second given port during the secondconnection is greater than a high value, and wherein the given rulevotes true otherwise.

In some embodiments, each given pair of connections includes first andsecond connections, wherein evaluating the features includes applying,to the features, a plurality of noise detectors including respectiveentries, wherein the noise detector votes false if the features from thegiven pair of connections are in accordance with one of the entries,wherein the given noise detector votes true otherwise, and whereindetecting the given pair of connections indicating malicious activityincludes detecting that at least a predetermined number of the noisedetectors vote true.

In one embodiment, each of the entries includes a specified internetprotocol (IP) address for the destination entity, and a specified portnumber on the destination entity used by the first connection. Inanother embodiment, each of the entries also includes a second specifiedport number on the destination entity used by the second connection. Ina further embodiment, each of the entries includes a specified internetprotocol (IP) address for the source entity and a specified port on thedestination entity used by the first connection.

There is also provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the presentinvention an apparatus, including a probe configured to collect datapackets transmitted between multiple entities over a network, and atleast one processor configured to group the collected packets at leastaccording to their source and destination entities and their times, intoconnections to which the packets belong, to identify pairs of theconnections having identical source and destination entities and timesthat are together within a specified time window, to generate sets offeatures for the identified pairs of the connections, to evaluate thefeatures of the pairs in order to detect a given pair of connectionsindicating malicious activity, and to generate an alert for themalicious activity.

There is further provided, in accordance with an embodiment of thepresent invention a computer software product, the product including anon-transitory computer-readable medium, in which program instructionsare stored, which instructions, when read by a computer, cause thecomputer to collect data packets transmitted between multiple entitiesover a network, to group the packets at least according to their sourceand destination entities and their times, into connections to which thepackets belong, to identify pairs of the connections having identicalsource and destination entities and times that are together within aspecified time window, to generate sets of features for the identifiedpairs of the connections, to evaluate the features in the pairs in orderto detect a given pair of connections indicating malicious activity, andto generate an alert for the malicious activity.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The disclosure is herein described, by way of example only, withreference to the accompanying drawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram that schematically shows a computing facilitycomprising an attack detection system that is configured to detect bindshell attacks, in accordance with an embodiment of the presentinvention;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the attack detection system, in accordancewith an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram that schematically shows a flow of softwareand data during a bind shell attack; and

FIG. 4 is a flow diagram that schematically illustrates a method ofdetecting a bind shell attack, in accordance with an embodiment of thepresent invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

To attack and gain unauthorized access to data in a computer facility,some of the attacks use computer instructions (e.g., a softwareapplication or a script) known as shells that can be used to remotelycontrol a computer in the facility. The shell can be used to eitherexecute a malicious application on the compromised computer or toprovide a user interface that an attacker can use to control thecompromised computer.

One example of an attack is a bind shell attack which moves laterallyover a network by opening an interactive command shell on a targetcomputer and connecting to the target computer from a previouslycompromised computer. In a bind shell attack, an initial connectionbetween two computers is used to either exploit a vulnerability on afirst port or to use credentials to access the first port, and afollow-up connection on a second (different) port is used for theinteractive shell.

Embodiments of the present invention provide methods and systems fordetecting bind shell attacks that can comprise confidential data storedon a corporate network. As described hereinbelow, data packetstransmitted between multiple entities over a network are collected, andthe packets are grouped at least according to their source anddestination entities and their times, into connections to which thepackets belong. Pairs of the connections having identical source anddestination entities and times that are together within a specified timewindow are identified, and sets of features are generated for theidentified pairs of the connections. The features in the pairs areevaluated in order to detect a given pair of connections indicatingmalicious activity (e.g., a bind shell attack), and an alert isgenerated for the malicious activity.

System Description

FIG. 1 is a block diagram that schematically shows an example of acomputing facility 20 comprising an attack detection system 22 thatmonitors data packets 24 transmitted between networked entities such asoffice computers 26 and servers 28 in order to identify maliciousactivity between a given office computer 26 and a given server 28, inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Entities such asoffice computers 26 and servers 28 may also be referred to herein ashosts. While embodiments described herein describe the maliciousactivity as a bind shell attack, detecting other types of maliciousactivity in a pair of connections between a source entity and adestination entity is considered to be within the spirit and scope ofthe present invention.

Each office computer 26 comprises an office computer identifier (ID) 30that can be used to uniquely identify each of the office computers, andeach server 28 comprises a server ID 32 that can be used to uniquelyidentify each of the servers. Examples of IDs 30 and 32 include, but arenot limited to, MAC addresses and IP addresses.

Office computers 26 are coupled to an office local area network (LAN)34, and servers 28 are coupled to a data center LAN 36. LANs 34 and 36are coupled to each other via bridges and 40, thereby enablingtransmission of data packets between office computers 26 and servers 28.In operation, servers 28 typically store sensitive (e.g., corporate)data.

Computing facility 20 also comprises an internet gateway 44, whichcouples computing facility 20 to public networks 46 such as theInternet. In embodiments described herein, attack detection system 22 isconfigured to detect a bind shell attack initiated by a networked entitysuch as a given office computer 26. In some embodiments, the networkedentity may be infected, via the Internet, by an attacking computer 48.

To protect the sensitive data, computing facility 20 may comprises afirewall 42 that controls traffic (i.e., the flow of data packets 24)between LANs 34 and 36 and Internet 46 based on predetermined securityrules. For example, firewall can be configured to allow office computers26 to convey data requests to servers 28, and to block data requestsfrom the servers to the office computers.

While the configuration in FIG. 1 shows attack detection system 22,office computers 26 and servers 28 coupled to LANs 34 and 36,configurations where the attack detection system, the office computersand servers are coupled to (and communicate over) any type of network(e.g., a wide area network or a data cloud) are considered to be withinthe spirit and scope of the present invention. In some embodiments, someor all of computers 26, servers 28 and attack detection system 22 may bedeployed in computing facility 20 as virtual machines.

Embodiments of the present invention describe methods and systems fordetecting malicious activity between networked entities that compriserespective central processing units. Examples of the entities includeoffice computers 26, servers 28, bridges 38 and 40, firewall 42 andgateway 44, as shown in FIG. 1 . Additional entities that cancommunicate over networks 34, 36 and 46 include, but are not limited to,personal computers (e.g., laptops), tablet computers, cellular phones,smart televisions, printers, routers and IOT devices.

Additionally, while embodiments here describe attack detection system 22detecting malicious content transmitted between a given office computer26 and a given server 28, detecting malicious content transmittedbetween any pair of the networked entities (e.g., between two officecomputers 26 or between a given office computer 26 and firewall 42) isconsidered to be within the spirit and scope of the present invention.Furthermore, while FIG. 1 shows computing facility 20 connected toInternet 46, detecting malicious activity in computing facilitiesisolated from public networks such as the Internet is considered to bewithin the spirit and scope if the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of attack detection system 22, in accordancewith an embodiment of the present invention. Attack detection system 22comprises a detection processor 50 and a memory 52, which are connectedby a system bus (not shown) to a network interface controller (NIC) 54that couples the anomaly detection system to LAN 36. In someembodiments, anomaly detection system 22 may comprise a user interface(UI) device 56 (e.g., an LED display) or another type of outputinterface. Examples of memory 52 include dynamic random-access memoriesand non-volatile random-access memories. In some embodiments, memory 52may include non-volatile storage devices such as hard disk drives andsolid-state disk drives.

In the configuration shown in FIG. 2 , anomaly detection system 22comprises a probe 58 that collects information on data packets 24transmitted over LAN 36. While the example in FIG. 2 shows probe 58 as amodule of anomaly detection system 22, the probe may be implemented aseither a standalone device coupled to LAN 36 or as a module in anotherdevice (e.g., firewall 42) coupled to the data center LAN. Using probe58 to collect data packets 24 from LAN 36 and processing the collecteddata packets to extract information is described, for example, in U.S.Patent Application 2014/0165207 to Engel et al. and U.S. PatentApplication 2015/0358344 to Mumcuoglu et al., whose disclosures areincorporated herein by reference.

In operation, processor 50 analyzes data packets 24, groups the datapackets into connections 60, and stores the connections to memory 52. Inembodiments described hereinbelow, processor 50 performs an additionalanalysis on the data packets in the connections to detect maliciousactivity in computing facility 20. In alternative embodiments, the tasksof collecting the data packets, grouping the data packets intoconnections 60, and analyzing the connections to detect the maliciousactivity may be split among multiple devices within computing facility20 (e.g., a given office computer 26) or external to the computingfacility (e.g., a data cloud based application).

Each connection 60 comprises one or more data packets 24 that aresequentially transmitted from a source entity to a given destinationentity. In embodiments described herein, the source entity is alsoreferred to as a given office computer 26, and the destination entity isalso referred to herein as a given server 28. In some embodiments,processor 50 may store connections 60 in memory 52 as afirst-in-first-out queue. In other embodiments, each connection 60 maycomprise one or more data packets that are transmitted (a) from a firstgiven office computer 26 to a second given office computer 26, (b) froma first given server 28 to a second given server 28, or (c) from a givenserver 28 to a given office computer 26.

In embodiments of the present invention, processor 50 generates a set offeatures from the data packets in each connection 60. Each givenconnection 60 comprises the following features 80:

-   -   A start time 62. The time that the given connection starts. In        some embodiments, start time 62 may be stored using a format        “dd.mm.yy hh:mm:ss”, where dd indicates a day, mm indicates a        month, yy indicates a year, hh indicates an hour, mm indicates a        minute, and ss indicates a second.    -   A duration 64. The duration (e.g., in seconds) of the given        connection. In some embodiments an end time of the connection        can be computed by adding the duration of the connection to the        start time of the connection.    -   A source IP address 66 (also referred to herein as source or        src).    -   A destination IP address 68 (also referred to herein as        destination or dst). The server ID for a given server 28 that is        targeted to receive the transmitted data packet(s).    -   A source port 70. A port number on the office computer used to        transmit the data. In some embodiments, source port 70 can be        used to identify a software service, executing on a given office        computer 26, that typically uses a fixed source port 70 or uses        a range of source ports 70.    -   A destination port 72. A port number on the destination computer        that completes the destination address (i.e., an IP address+a        port number) for the data packets in the connection. As        described hereinbelow, connections 60 can be grouped into pairs        of connections 60 that occur in first and second phases (i.e.,        phase1 and phase2). Port may also be referred to as p1 during        the first phase/connection and as p2 during the second phase.    -   A protocol 74. In operation, processor 50 can perform deep        packet inspection to identify, in connections 60, protocols 74        such as Layer3 (e.g., TCP and UDP) and Layer4 (e.g., SSH, Telnet        and SOAP).    -   A volume 76. The amount of raw data (also known as payload)        transmitted (i.e., in the data packets in the message) from a        given office computer 26 to a given server 28 (i.e., excluding        Layer2/Layer3 headers (such as TCP/UDP/Ethernet headers).    -   A reverse volume 78. The amount of raw data transmitted, during        the connection, from a given server 28 to a given office        computer 26.

In embodiments described herein, processor 50 groups multiple datapackets 24 into a given connection 60. In some embodiments, processor 50can identify each connection 60 via a 5-tuple comprising a given sourceIP address 66, a given source port 70, a given destination IP address68, a given destination port 72 and a given protocol 74.

In one example where the protocol is TCP, the connection starts with athree-way handshake, and ends with either a FIN, an RST or a time-out.Processor 50 can track data packets 24, and construct the entireconnection, since all the data packets in the connection are tied toeach other with sequence numbers. In another example where the protocolis UDP, then there is no handshake. In this case, processor 50 can groupthe messages whose data packets 24 have the same 4-tuple comprising agiven source IP address 66, a given source port 70, a given destinationIP address 68 and a given destination port 72 (i.e., from the first datapacket until there is a specified “silence time”).

Memory 52 also stores features 80, a classifier 82, rules and noisedetectors 86. In operation, processor 50 can generate features 80 fromsingle connections 60 or pairs of the connections (i.e., connections 60that have identical source IP addresses 66, identical destinationaddresses 68, and that are transmitted within a specified time window).In one example, a given feature 80 for a single connection 60 maycomprise the total data volume (i.e., adding the volumes for all thedata packets in the given connection) in the given connection. Inanother example, a given feature 80 for a pair of connections 60 maycomprise a time period between the end of the first connection in thepair and the start of the second connection in the pair. Additionalexamples of features 80 are described hereinbelow.

In embodiments of the present invention, processor 50 can use features80, noise detectors 86 and rules 84 for classifier 82 to identifymalicious activity (e.g., a bind shell attack) between a given officecomputer 26 and a given server 28. Examples of noise detectors 86 andrules 84 are described hereinbelow.

Processor 50 comprises a general-purpose central processing unit (CPU)or special-purpose embedded processors, which are programmed in softwareor firmware to carry out the functions described herein. This softwaremay be downloaded to the computer in electronic form, over a network,for example. Additionally or alternatively, the software may be storedon tangible, non-transitory computer-readable media, such as optical,magnetic, or electronic memory media. Further additionally oralternatively, at least some of the functions of processor 50 may becarried out by hard-wired or programmable digital logic circuits.

Malicious Activity Detection

FIG. 3 is a block diagram that schematically illustrates a flow ofsoftware and data during an example of bind shell attack, in accordancewith an embodiment of the present invention. In this example, a givenoffice computer is infected and a given server 28 storing (or having anability to access) sensitive data 90 is attacked. The infected officecomputer comprises a processor 92 and a memory 94, and the attackedserver comprises a processor 96 and a memory 98 (e.g., storage devicessuch as hard disk drives) that stores sensitive data 90.

In the configuration shown in FIG. 3 , the bind shell attack starts whena given office computer 26 is infected by loading memory 92 with acompromised software 100 comprising a first payload 102 and a secondpayload 104. Payloads 102 and 104 comprise respective sequences ofcomputer instructions configured to perform malicious activity.

To infect the given office computer, compromised software 100 (andthereby payloads 102 and 104) can be loaded into memory 94 by a user(not shown) or via the Internet. For example, processor 92 can retrievecompromised software 100 from attacking computer 48 and load thecompromised software into memory 94 in response to a user (not shown)pressing on a malicious link in an email.

In FIG. 3 , connections 60 and destination ports 72 can bedifferentiated by appending a letter to the identifying numeral, so thatthe connections comprise initial connection 60A and subsequentconnection 60B, and the destination ports comprise ports 72A and 72B.While executing on processor 92, compromised software 100 startsattacking the given server by conveying, during first connection 60A,first payload 102 via first port 72A (i.e., the destination port usedduring the first connection in a given pair of connections 60) on thegiven server. Since first payload 102 is typically small, only a smallamount of data is transmitted from the infected office computer to thegiven server (also referred to herein as the attacked server) during thefirst connection.

In response to executing first payload 102, processor 96 opens, on thegiven server, second port 72B (i.e., the destination port used duringthe second connection in a given pair of connections 60) for inboundconnections. In a typical configuration, firewall 42 allows outboundconnections from the infected office computer to the attacked server viaport 72A (e.g., port “100”), but does not allow outbound connectionsfrom the attacked server to either the infected office computer or theInternet.

Opening port 72B enables port 72B to receive larger amounts of data.This enables the compromised software 100 executing on processor 92 tocomplete attacking the given server by conveying, during subsequentsecond connection 60B, second payload 104 to the attacked server. Uponcompleting the attack, compromised software 100 can interact, via thesecond port, with the attacked server (i.e., via payload 104 executingon processor 96 in order to retrieve (i.e., “steal”) sensitive data 90from the attacked server. In some embodiments payload 104 can beconfigured to retrieve data 90 and transmit the retrieved sensitive datato the infected office computer via port 72B.

FIG. 4 is a flow diagram that schematically illustrates a method fordetecting a bind shell attack on computing facility 20, in accordancewith an embodiment of the present invention. In embodiments of thepresent invention, attack detection system 22 can detect a bind shellattack (e.g., the attack described in the description referencing FIG. 3hereinabove) by analyzing pairs of connections 60 between pairs ofsource and destination entities in computing facility (for example, agiven office computer 26 and a given server 28).

In a collection step 120, processor 50 uses NIC 54 and probe 58 tocollect data packets 24 transmitted between the entities coupled tonetworks 34 and 36 (e.g., office computers 26 and servers 28), and in agrouping step 122, the detection processor groups the collected datapackets into connections 60. The following is an example of (a partiallist) of raw data collected for connections 60A and 60B:

Connection 60A

-   -   Source IP address 66: 10.0.0.1    -   Destination IP address 68: 10.0.0.2    -   Source port 70: 1,000    -   Destination port 72: 100    -   Start time 62: 15.11.17 11:49:02    -   Duration 64: 15 sec    -   Volume (source to destination) 76: 1,024 B    -   Reverse volume 78 (destination to source): 5,454 B    -   Protocol 74: IMAP

Connection 60B

-   -   Source IP address 66: 10.0.0.1    -   Destination IP address 68: 10.0.0.2    -   Source port 70: 2,000    -   Destination port 72: 200    -   Start time 62: 15.11.17 11:49:22    -   Duration 64: 500 sec    -   Volume (source to destination) 76: 10 KB    -   Reverse Volume 78 (destination to source): 15 KB    -   Protocol 74: unknown

In a first identification step 124, processor 50 identifies pairs ofconnections 60 that comprise identical source computers (e.g., officecomputers 26), identical destination computers (e.g., servers 28), andare within a specified time window.

Bind shell attacks typically comprise two consecutive connections 60between a source (i.e., a given office computer 26) and a destination(i.e., a given server 28), each of the connections using different ports72 on the destination. In step 124, given a list L of connections 60between the source and the destination, processor 50 can create a list(not shown) of connection pairs that can be candidates for a bind shellprocedure. Processor 50 can then use the following algorithm to identifythe connection pairs:

-   -   Define d as the maximal time (i.e., the time window) between the        start of phase1 and the start of phase2 connections;    -   init pairs_list=[ ];    -   for each connection c1 in L;    -   possible_phase2←all connections c2 in L that have    -   i. c2.start_time between (c1.start_time, c1.start_time+d)    -   ii. c2.rvolume>0    -   add to pairs_list these pairs: [c1, c2i] for each c2i in        possible_phase2;

The following is an example table showing a connection pair processedfrom the raw data described supra:

Source IP address 66 10.0.0.1 Destination IP address 68 10.0.0.2 Sourceport 70 (phase 1) 1,000 Source port 70 (phase 2) 2,000 Destination port72 (phase 1) 100 Destination port 72 (phase 2) 200 Start time 62(phase 1) 15.11.17 11:49:02 Start time 62 (phase 2) 15.11.17 11:49:22Duration 64 (phase 1) 15 sec Duration 64 (phase 2) 500 sec Volume 76(phase 1) 1,024 B Reverse volume (phase 1) 5,454 B Volume 76 (phase 2)10 KB Reverse volume (phase 2) 15 KBwhere phase1 indicates the first connection in the pair, and phase2indicates the second connection in the pair.

In a generation step 126, the detection processor generates features 80from the pairs of connections, and in an application step 128, processor50 applies a set of noise detectors 86 and in application step 130processor 50 applies a set of rules 84 to the features in the identifiedpairs of connections 60.

While monitoring data packets 24, processor 50 may identify largenumbers of pairs of connections 60. Noise detectors 86 comprise, for thepairs of connections, sets of features 80 (e.g., destinations 68, ports72 and protocols 74) that are may be common and/or may have a lowprobability of being malicious. Examples of noise detectors 86 include,but are not limited to:

-   -   NoiseDetector01 (uses dst, p1, p2). This noise detector returns        a dataframe of network services comprising destination IP        address 68 and destination port 72 used during by the first        connection 60 in the pair. These network services can, based on        a request, initiate a new session to a specific destination port        72 (phase 2). For example, a function Function01 (dst, p1, p2)        can be deployed that, for every destination, computes how many        sources accessed that destination with specific p1 and p2. If        the function returns a high computed value, this can indicate        that the combination (dst, p1, p2) is probably benign since (a)        there is a service that is usually accessed by p1 and then by        p2, and (b) many sources connect to that destination using that        service. Therefore, if Function01 (dst, p1, p2) is high on a        specific destination, all the connection pairs with (p1,p2) to        that destination can be flagged as probably not being        suspicious.    -   NoiseDetector02 (uses src, p1). This noise detector 86 describes        a group having multiple sources that connect to many        destinations via a specific p1, and then connect to the        destinations via an arbitrary p2. This group can be defined when        the source uses a specific p1 and a small NoiseDetector02 number        (e.g., greater than 0, greater than 1, greater than 2 or greater        than 3) of p2s to connect a to a large NoiseDetector02 number        (e.g., greater than 5, greater than 6, greater than 7 greater        than 8, greater than 9 or greater than 10) of destinations. This        noise detector 86 can flag the connection pairs with these        sources as probably not being suspicious when the destination        port during phase1 is that specific p1.    -   NoiseDetector03 (uses src, p2). This noise detector 86 describes        sources that connect to many destinations using different p1s        and then connect using a specific p2. This group is defined when        the source connects to a large NoiseDetector03 number (e.g.,        greater than 5, greater than 6, greater than 7 greater than 8,        greater than 9 or greater than 10) of destinations via a small        NoiseDetector03 number (e.g., greater than 0, greater than 1,        greater than 2 or greater than 3) of p2s with a specific p1.        NoiseDetector03 can flag the connection pairs with these hosts        as probably not being suspicious when p2 is the specific p2.    -   NoiseDetector04 (uses dst, p1). This noise detector 86 describes        specific services that result in a second connection 60 using an        arbitrary p2. This noise detector is defined when at least one        given host 28 (i.e., having a given destination IP address 68)        connects to one of the specific services identified by [dst,        p1], and the difference between the number of p2s, and distinct        destinations connecting to the service is greater than a small        NoiseDetector04 threshold (e.g., 2, 3 or 4). This noise detector        can flag (i.e., as not being suspicious) the connection pairs        that have dst and p1.    -   NoiseDetector05 (uses p1, p2). If [p1, p2] is a pair of ports 72        that commonly appears in pairs of connections 60, and comes from        at least a small NoiseDetector05 number (e.g., 1, 2, 3 or) of        sources, then [p1, p2] can be flagged as probably not being        suspicious in facility 20 by a given noise detector 86. These        pairs may vary for different facilities (i.e., different        customers), and are determined using a defined model. This noise        detectors can flag (i.e., as not being suspicious) the        connection pairs that use these pairs of p1 and p2.    -   NoiseDetector06 (uses p1, p2). This noise detector 86 describes        [src, dst] pairs that communicate with numerous arbitrary        (p1,p2) pairs. Anomalous [src, dst] pairs can be flagged as        probably not being suspicious using a given noise detector 86.

In the examples of the noise detectors described supra, each of thenoise detectors can vote false (i.e., not suspicious) for any pairs ofconnections 60 that were flagged. Likewise, each of the noise detectorscan vote true (i.e., may be suspicious) for any pairs of the connectionsthat were not flagged.

In addition to generating features from the data packets in eachconnection 60, as described supra, processor 50 can compute additionalfeatures 80 for each pair of connections 60 based on the information inthe connections (e.g., start time 60 source IP address 66 etc.).Examples of computed features 80 include, but are not limited to:

-   -   Start_to_start_time_diff: start time 62 (phase2)−start time 62        (phase 1). In other words, start_to_start_time_diff is the time        between the start time of phase1 and the start time of phase2.    -   End_to_start_time_diff: (start time 62 (phase1)+duration 64        (phase1))−start time 62 (phase 2). In other words,        end_to_start_time_diff is the time between the end time of        phase1 and the start time of phase2. Note that this result can        be negative if phase1 ended before phase 2 started.    -   Volume_to_rvolume_ratio: volume 76 (phase1)/reverse volume 78        (phase 1).    -   Path_phase1: A given protocol 74 (e.g., NetBios or TCP) used for        phase1.    -   Path_phase2: A given protocol 74 used for phase2.

Examples of rules 84 include, but are not limited to:

Rule01 (uses duration 64 and volume 76 in phase 2):

-   -   False IF duration_phase2<=a small Rule01 value (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4        or 5 seconds) AND volume_phase2<=a negligible Rule01 value        (e.g., 0.01 MB, 0.02 MB, 0.03 MB, 0.04 MB, 0.05 MB or 0.06 MB).    -   else: True    -   Rationale: Usually phase2 has a minimal duration 64, since this        is the interactive part where the attacker executes command on        the destination. Also, if the phase2 contains a payload, the        payload will have a minimal reasonable size.

Rule02 (uses volume 76 in phase 1):

-   -   True if volume_phase1<=a small Rule02 value (e.g., 1*1024*1024,        2*1024*1024, 3*1024*1024, 4*1024*1024, 5*1024*1024 or        6*1024*1024). Note that the Rule02 values refer to respective        numbers of bytes.    -   else False    -   Rationale: This indicates a smaller probability for a “standard”        communication session since a small volume 76 in phase1 may        indicate the use of a small payload/stager, and phase1 is not a        standard session.

Rule03 (uses start_to_start_time_diff):

-   -   True if start_to_start_time_diff>=a negligible Rule03 value        (e.g., 1, 2, 3 or 4) and start_to_start_time_diff<a minimal        Rule03 value (e.g., 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9). In other words, Rule03        votes true if start_to_start_time_diff is negligible. Note that        the Rule03 values refer to respective numbers of seconds (i.e.,        time values).    -   else False    -   Rationale: The second connection in a bind shell attack is        likely to start shortly after the start of the first connection,        but not immediately after the first connection.

Rule04 (uses end_to_start_time_diff):

-   -   True if end_to_start_time_diff>a negligible Rule04 value that        can be positive or negative (e.g., −2, −1, 0 or 1) and    -    end_to_start_time_diff<=a small Rule04 value (e.g., 3, 4, 5, 6,        7 or 8). In other words, Rule04 votes true if        end_to_start_time_diff is negligible. Note that the Rule04        values refer to respective numbers of seconds (i.e., time        values).    -   else False    -   Rationale: Typically, an attacker prefers not to keep the first        connection open more than needed since it may be used by others        as well. Therefore, in an attack, phase2 typically starts        shortly before or shortly after phase1 ends.

Rule05: (uses Path_phase1)

-   -   True if Path_phase1 (e.g., NetBios or TCP) is in        LIST_OF_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION_PROTOCOLS (i.e., a specified set        of protocols 74)    -   Else False    -   Rationale: In some cases, phase1 is accomplished using a        standard protocol that allows remote code execution. Using        remote code execution, the source host can remotely open the        second port p2 on the destination.

Rule06 (uses Path_phase2):

-   -   True if Path_phase2 is unknown    -   else False    -   Rationale: Commonly, the protocol used in phase2 is a very        simple protocol developed by the attacker. In such cases, the        tool used to parse network traffic will not recognize it.

Rule07 (uses Path_phase2):

-   -   True if Path_phase2 (e.g., SSH) is in        LIST_OF_REMOTE_SESSION_PROTOCOLS (i.e., a specified set of        protocols 74)    -   else False    -   Rationale: Sometimes, the attacker may use a known protocol 74        for remote sessions as the protocol for phase2.

Rule08:

-   -   False if (a count of distinct source IP addresses 66 and        destination IP addresses 68 that communicated with the ports P1        and P2 in the network)>a small value (e.g., 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7).    -   Else True    -   Rationale: If [p1, p2] is a couple that appears a lot in the        network (i.e., from many source IP addresses 66 and to many        destination IP addresses 68), then the [p1, p2] couple indicates        a lower probability of an attack.

Rule09 (Function01 is described supra):

-   -   False if Function01 (dst, p1, p2)>a high value (e.g., 3, 4, 5,        or 6).    -   Else True    -   Rationale: If a first given connection 60 to a given destination        IP address 68 via P1 is commonly followed by a second given        connection 60 to the given destination IP address via a        different port 60, than the pair of the first and the second        given connections is more likely to be normal activity and not a        bind shell attack.

As described supra processor 50 extracts respective sets of attributesfor identified pairs of connections 60, and compares the extracted setsof attributes to previously identified sets of attributes found tocategorize any pairs of the connections as suspicious. In someembodiments, processor 50 can extract and compare the attributes bycalculating the noise detectors, extracting the features, calculatingthe rules, and applying the model, as described respectively in steps126, 128 and 130.

In some embodiments, rules 84 can be categorized into groups based onone or more subjects covered by the rules. As described hereinbelow,processor 50 can use a number of rules that are true for a given groupas a parameter for detecting bind shell attacks. Examples of groupsinclude:

-   -   Rules 84 relating to timing. These rules can use start times 62        and durations 64 in the pair of connections. Examples of rules        84 in the timing group include Rule01, Rule03 and Rule04        described supra.    -   Rules related to flow (i.e., protocols 72 and ports 74) in the        pair of connections. Examples of rules 84 in the protocol group        include Phase1_protocl, Rule06 and Rule07 described supra.    -   Rules related to noise detectors 86. Examples of rules 84 in the        noise detector group include Rule08 and Rule09 described supra.    -   Rules relating to traffic features such as volume, reverse        volume and duration of the first and second phases. Examples of        rules in this group include Rule01 and Rule02 described supra.

In some embodiments, a given feature 80 may be based on a given group ofrules 84. For example, a given feature 80 may comprise a number of rules84 in the timing group that vote “true”. Another example of a givenfeature 80 based on multiple rules 84 comprises a number of all rules 84that vote true.

In a second identification step 132, processor 50 identifies, based onfeatures 80, noise detectors 86 and results from rules 84, maliciousactivity in a given pair of connections 60 that indicates a bind shellattack on a given network entity such as a given server 28. In additionto using the rules and the noise detectors as described hereinbelow,processor 50 can evaluate features 80 by determining a baseline of thefeatures for normally observed traffic, comparing the features in thepairs of connections to the baseline of the features and suspectingmalicious activity if the features in a given pair of connections 60deviate from the baseline.

In one embodiment, processor 50 can evaluate features by analyzingcombinations of features 80. In another embodiment, processor 50 canevaluate features 50 by applying rules 84 and noise detectors 86, andcomparing respective numbers of the rules and the noise detectors thatvote true against a predetermined threshold. In an additionalembodiment, a given rule 84 voting true or a given feature having aspecific value (e.g., a specific destination port 72) may indicatemalicious activity. In a further embodiment, a number of rules 84 in agiven category voting true can be used as a parameter in identifyingmalicious activity.

In one specific embodiment, processor 50 can identify a set destinationports 72 that are commonly seen in connections 60, and the detectionprocessor can suspect malicious activity if it detects a pair ofconnections 60 that use a “new” (or rarely used) destination port 72. Inanother embodiment, processor 59 can flag a given pair of connections 60as suspicious if the destination ports in the first and the secondconnections in the pair are different.

Finally in an alert step 134, processor 50 generates an alert (e.g., onuser interface device 56) indicating the bind shell attack on the givennetworked entity, and the method ends. For example, processor 50 cangenerate the alert by presenting, on user interface device 56, a messageindicating an attack on a given server 28 via a given office computer26, and a type of the attack (e.g., bind shell).

While embodiments herein describe processor 50 performing steps 120-134described supra, other configurations are considered to be within thespirit and scope of the present invention. For example, probe 58 maycomprise a standalone unit that collects data packets 24, as describedin step 120, and remaining steps 122-134 can be performed by anycombination of processor 50, any other processors in computing facility20, or a data cloud (not shown).

It will be appreciated that the embodiments described above are cited byway of example, and that the present invention is not limited to whathas been particularly shown and described hereinabove. Rather, the scopeof the present invention includes both combinations and subcombinationsof the various features described hereinabove, as well as variations andmodifications thereof which would occur to persons skilled in the artupon reading the foregoing description and which are not disclosed inthe prior art.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method, comprising: collecting datapackets transmitted between multiple entities over a network; groupingthe packets at least according to their source and destination entitiesand their times, into connections to which the packets belong;identifying pairs of the connections having identical source anddestination entities and times that are together within a specified timewindow, wherein each given pair of connections comprises first andsecond connections; generating sets of features comprising port numbersfrom header information in the packets of the identified pairs of theconnections, each set of features for a given pair comprising firstfeatures of the first connection in the given pair and second featuresof the second connection in the given pair; evaluating, by a processor,the features in the pairs, including the port numbers, in order todetect at least one pair of the connections whose first and secondfeatures differ, thereby indicating a bind shell attack; and generatingan alert for the bind shell attack.
 2. The method according to claim 1,wherein detecting the bind shell attack comprises detecting that theport number on the destination entity in the first connection in thegiven pair of connections is different than the port number on thedestination entity in the second connection in the given pair ofconnections.
 3. The method according to claim 1, and comprisinggenerating additional sets of features from respective Internet Protocol(IP) addresses in the identified pairs of the connections, and whereinevaluating the features comprises evaluating the additional sets offeatures.
 4. The method according to claim 3, wherein detecting the bindshell attack comprises detecting that the IP address of the destinationentity in the given pair does not match a specified IP address anddetecting that the port number on the given destination entity in thefirst connection in the given pair does not match a specified portnumber.
 5. The method according to claim 3, wherein detecting the bindshell attack comprises detecting that the given IP address of thedestination entity in the given pair does not match a specified IPaddress and detecting that the port number on the given destinationentity in the second connection in the given pair does not match aspecified port number.
 6. The method according to claim 1, wherein agiven feature comprises an Internet Protocol (IP) address of a givenentity in a given connection.
 7. The method according to claim 1,wherein a given feature comprises a protocol of a given connection. 8.The method according to claim 7, wherein detecting the bind shell attackcomprises detecting that the protocol used in a given connection in thegiven pair of connections is either unknown or is in a specified set ofprotocols.
 9. A method, comprising: collecting data packets transmittedbetween multiple entities over a network; grouping the packets at leastaccording to their source and destination entities and their times, intoconnections to which the packets belong; identifying pairs of theconnections having identical source and destination entities and timesthat are together within a specified time window, wherein each givenpair of connections comprises first and second connections; generatingsets of features from header information in the packets of theidentified pairs of the connections, each set of features for a givenpair comprising first features of the first connection in the given pairand second features of the second connection in the given pair;evaluating, by a processor, the features in the pairs in order to detectat least one pair of the connections whose first and second featuresdiffer, thereby indicating a bind shell attack; and generating an alertfor the bind shell attack, wherein evaluating the features comprisesdetermining a baseline of the features, and comparing the features inthe pairs of connections to the baseline of the features.
 10. A computersoftware product, the product comprising a non-transitorycomputer-readable medium, in which program instructions are stored,which instructions, when read by a computer, cause the computer: tocollect data packets transmitted between multiple entities over anetwork; to group the packets at least according to their source anddestination entities and their times, into connections to which thepackets belong; to identify pairs of the connections having identicalsource and destination entities and times that are together within aspecified time window, wherein each given pair of connections comprisesfirst and second connections; to generate sets of features comprisingport numbers from header information in the packets of the identifiedpairs of the connections, each set of features for a given paircomprising first features of the first connection in the given pair andsecond features of the second connection in the given pair; to evaluateby a processor, the features in the pairs, including the port numbers,in order to detect at least one pair of the connections whose first andsecond features differ, thereby indicating a bind shell attack; and togenerate an alert for the bind shell attack.
 11. A method, comprising:collecting data packets transmitted between multiple entities over anetwork; grouping the packets at least according to their source anddestination entities and their times, into connections to which thepackets belong; identifying pairs of the connections having identicalsource and destination entities and times that are together within aspecified time window, wherein each given pair of connections comprisesfirst and second connections; identifying respective start and end timesof the first and second connections in the identified pairs; comparing,by a processor, the end time of the first connection in a given pair tothe start time of the second connection in the given pair in order todetect a bind shell attack; and generating an alert for the bind shellattack.
 12. The method according to claim 11, wherein an additionalfeature comprises a difference between the start times of the first andthe second connections.
 13. The method according to claim 12 whereindetecting the bind shell attack comprises detecting that the differencebetween the start times of the first and the second connections iswithin a specified range.
 14. The method according to claim 11, whereindetecting the bind shell attack comprises detecting that the differencebetween the end time of the first connection and the start time of thesecond connection is greater than a specified value that can be positiveor negative.
 15. The method according to claim 11, wherein a givenfeature comprises a duration of a given connection.
 16. The methodaccording to claim 15, and comprising generating additional sets offeatures from volumes of the identified pairs of the connections, andwherein evaluating the features comprises evaluating the additionalfeatures.
 17. The method according to claim 16, wherein detecting thebind shell attack comprises detecting that the duration of the secondconnection is greater than or equal to a specified duration anddetecting that the volume of data transmitted in the second connectionis greater than or equal to a specified value.
 18. A method, comprising:collecting data packets transmitted between multiple entities over anetwork; grouping the packets at least according to their source anddestination entities and their times, into connections to which thepackets belong; identifying pairs of the connections having identicalsource and destination entities and times that are together within aspecified time window, wherein each given pair of connections comprisesfirst and second connections; generating sets of features fromrespective reverse volumes in the identified pairs of the connections;evaluating, by a processor, the features in the pairs in order to detecta given pair of connections indicating a bind shell attack; andgenerating an alert for the bind shell attack.
 19. The method accordingto claim 18, wherein a given feature for a given pair of connectionscomprises the volume of data transmitted from the source entity to thedestination entity during the first connection divided by the volume ofdata transmitted from the destination entity to the source entity duringthe first connection.
 20. The method according to claim 18, whereindetecting the bind shell attack comprises detecting that the volume ofdata transmitted in the first connection in the given pair is less thana specified value.